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Introduction
I.

Saudi Religious Police Beat an Arrestee to Death Following a Raid
On May 23, 2007, more than a dozen officers of Saudi Arabia’s religious

police, The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (or
simply, Haia) stormed into the Riyadh home suspected bootlegger Salman alHuraisi in search of illegal alcohol.1 They found large quantities of alcohol in
the apartment. They then proceeded to detain all members of the family within
the house. Huraisi was taken to a local station where he was severely beaten
and left barely conscious. 2

The Haia officers called an ambulance when

Huraisi started coughing up blood during one such beating and interrogation.
Huraisi’s family was apparently present during the beatings. 3 The autopsy
revealed that the beatings caused his death. 4

When al-Huraisi’s father,

Muhammad, age seventy-three, received the body for burial, he reported that
“He was so badly beaten it was hard for us to recognize him.

There was a

Human Rights Watch, Saudi Arabia: Hold Religious Police Accountable for Killing
Human Rights Watch (Jul. 25, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/07/24/saudiarabia-hold-religious-police-accountable-killing; See also Raid Qusti, Vice Cops Change
Testimony in Huraisi Retrial, Arab News (Apr. 9, 2008),
http://www.arabnews.com/node/310793. Saudi Arabia has three police forces, a regular
police force, analogous to state troopers, a secret police, the General Investigation Directorate
(Mabahith), analogous to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the religious police
force, the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Raid Qusti, Al-Huraisi Murder Trial Begins at Riyadh High Court, Arab News (Oct. 31,
2007), http://www.arabnews.com/node/305122.
1
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crack in his skull, his right eye was popped out, his jaw was broken…His
mother could not absorb the entire thing and she fainted in the washroom.”5
In addition to the homicide, the Haia agents violated multiple provisions
of the Saudi Law of Criminal Procedure, including entering a private home
without judicial authorization or a prosecutor-issued warrant, and detaining
several women without either a male family member or neutral female escort
present.6
In the months that followed, Saudi Arabia’s Interior Ministry investigated
the incident, detaining eight men involved.

The entire investigation and

resulting trial appeared to have been a sham. All Haia officers were cleared of
all charges, and only one man was held responsible in al-Huraisi’s death.7 The
man was a private citizen who accompanied the police on the raid – a
volunteer.

The case was appealed, albeit with some resistance from the

judiciary, including surprise vacations announced on the morning of which
oral arguments were scheduled, in late 2008.

According to available

information, the appeal is apparently still pending.8
This case is illustrative of the current state of Saudi Arabia on several
levels. All levels of police appear to abuse their authority and do not appear to
have ever been held liable for official misconduct. Nevertheless, there appears
5 Raid Qusti, Family Members Bury Al-Huraisi in Riyadh, Arab News (Jul. 31, 2007),
http://www.arabnews.com/node/301285.
6 Law of Criminal Procedure, Arts. 2, 40, 41, 53.
7 Raid Qusti, Commission Cleared in Huraisi Death, Arab News, (Jun. 26, 2007).
http://www.arabnews.com/node/297170.
8 Mansour al-Shehri, Commission Trial Cancelled, Judges on Vacation, Saudi Gazette,
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=200804163393;
See also Human Rights Watch, Award to Saudi Human Rights Lawyer, Human Rights Watch
(Nov. 11, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/11/11/award-saudi-human-rights-lawyer.
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to be enough resistance from the Saudi population that the monarchy is now
pressing the police, albeit on a small level, to rein in on their excesses or be
held accountable.9
II.

Statement of Purpose: A Comparison of American and Saudi Search
and Seizure Law and Practice
The purpose of this paper is to prove that not only is the United States

more protective of individual liberties than the constitution of Saudi Arabia
(which will probably not surprise the reader), but to explain exactly why this is
so. This paper will investigate each country’s search and seizure rules, their
laws will be examined and compared along the following lines: historical basis
for current law, the current rules governing searches and seizures of persons
and property, whether law enforcement must obtain prior authorization to
conduct a search or to seize evidence, and the process for doing so, exceptions
to the general rules, limitations on the manner and scope of judicially
authorized searches or seizures, remedies or sanctions for violations of the
rules and their exceptions, and how well existing laws are followed in practice.

9 Contrast the above case with one that occurred earlier this year, where the head of the
Haia, Sheikh Abdul Latif Abdul Aziz al-Sheigh appeared at the funeral of a man killed in a car
chase with his agents and consoled the grieving father, claiming that “he was [t]here to fulfill
his duty.” Al Arabiya, They were Innocent: Saudis React to Religious Police Car-Chase Death,
Al-Arabiya (Sept, 29, 2013), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/09/29/They-were-innocent-Saudi-Arabia-reacts-to-religious-police-car-chase-deaths.html.
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Saudi Law: A Modern Interpretation of
Medieval Law
Saudi Arabia’s closest analogue to a constitution is the monarchy’s
statement of “Basic Law,” published on March 1, 1992. Article One of the basic
law states that
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab
Islamic State. Its religion is Islam. Its constitution is
Almighty God’s Book, The Holy Qur’an, and the Sunna
(Traditions) of the Prophet (PHUB).
Arabic is the
Language of the Kingdom. The City of Riyadh is the
capital.
The Basic Law of Governance, art. I.10 The basic law states clearly that the
constitution consists of scripture and prophetic tradition. Included within this
definition is a traditional religious law, Sharia, which functions as the default
criminal law in Saudi Arabia, albeit without actually being codified as such.11
While the Saudi monarchy does pass statutes to cover new problems as they
arise, such as modern drug trafficking, much of its criminal law and procedure
follows centuries old tradition.12

Basic Law of Governance, art. 1. Art. 7 further emphasizes that “…the Book of God
and the Sunna of the Prophet…are the ultimate sources of reference for this law and the other
laws of the state.
11 Rudolph Peters, Crime and punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice form the
Sixteenth to the Twenty-First Century, 148 (2009).
12 English text of the narcotics statutes and regulations are not easily obtainable.
Summaries of the statutes may be found at the Saudi Ministry of the Interior website: Ministry
of Interior, General Director of Narcotics Control, Penalties,
https://www.moi.gov.sa/wps/portal/narcoticscontrol/!ut/p/b1/04_SjzQ0MzMzNzaztDDRj9CP
ykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGjzOLd_cKCjd09jA0NXM2cDTwDTT38vU1DDbyDzfSDU_P0c6McFQHOY
XNI/?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/narcotics+control/narcotics+control/pen
alties/&WCM_Parent_Path=/narcotics+control/narcotics+control/penalties.
10
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In order to understand modern Saudi search and seizure procedure, it
will therefore be helpful to investigate how the Quran and Sunna treat the
topic.

The following sections will examine the scriptural basis for Islamic

search and seizure rules and then explain how they were subsequently
interpreted.
As a preliminary note, the Quran provided for the establishment of
religious police. The verses state: “Let there arise out of you a band of people
inviting all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is
wrong…”13 They were referred to as muhtasib, and had the duty of walking the
streets to enforce religious provisions, such as prohibitions on drinking and
owning or playing musical instruments.14 In later centuries when the Muslim
state grew and split, they worked alongside and in addition to state-employed
police. They Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice is a
continuation of this old institution.

Quran 3:104.
Sadiq Reza, Islam’s Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure in Islamic Doctrine and
Muslim Practice, 40 Georgetown journal of International Law, 703, 732-33 (2009).
13
14
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I.

Scripture and Tradition as the Starting Point for Search and Seizure
Law.
A.

Searches: A General Protection of Private Homes

The starting point for search rules comes from the following verses:
O you who have believed, do not enter houses other
than your own houses until you ascertain welcome
and greet their inhabitants. That is best for you;
perhaps you will be reminded. And if you do not find
anyone therein, do not enter until permission has been
given you. And if it is said to you, “Go back,” then go
back; it is purer for you. And Allah is Knowing of what
you do.” 15
The scriptural source for search rules comes from another passage:
O you who have believed, avoid much [negative]
assumption. Indeed, some assumption is sin. And do
not spy or backbite each other. Would one of you like
to eat the flesh of his brother when dead? You would
detest it. And fear Allah; indeed, Allah is accepting of
repentance and merciful. 16
One last verse prescribes a final search rule: “…It is not righteous to
enter houses from the back, but righteousness is in one who fears Allah. And
enter houses from their doors. And fear Allah that you may succeed.”17 This is
essentially an extension on the prior two commandments, and commands
readers not to sneak in the back door of a building.
Two of the three verses are directed toward all believers, and so
presumably apply to all Muslims, including state actors.

Collectively, these

15 Qur’an, 24:27-28. Translation taken from the following source:
http://quran.com/24/27-28
16 Qur’an 49:12. Translation: http://quran.com/49/12. The word “assumption” is
sometimes replaced by the word “suspicion” in other translations.
17 Qur’an 2:189. Translation: http://quran.com/2/189
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verses prescribe three rules: (1) Muslims should not enter the homes of other
Muslims, whether empty or not, without permission, (2) Muslims should not
spy on one another, and (3) if Muslims do enter others believers’ homes, they
should use the main entrance.
Some sayings of Muhammad have been passed down through tradition
to elaborate on these rules, but they were primarily developed by his
companions and successors. 18

Several stories of the second Muslim ruler,

Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab served as examples for the formation of Muslim
law and criminal procedure. In one such story, Umar and a companion were
wandering around Mecca late at night. They came across a home with loud
sounds coming from inside.

Umar and his companion concluded that the

people inside were drinking, which is contrary to Muslim law. Nevertheless,
Umar left without bothering the party inside, concluding that he had learned of
the drinking through spying.19 On another occasion, Umar was informed that
a man was drinking wine. He went to the man’s house and climbed over the
wall without permission to find him drinking.

The homeowner persuaded

Umar to leave without inflicting any penalty, since Umar had entered the house
without permission to investigate, which was equated with spying.20 These two

18 For example, Muhammad was said to have established a specific procedure for
seeking permission to enter a home and would not look through open doors before receiving
permission to enter. III Sunan Abu Da’ud 1429, nos. 5158, 5167. He also threatened to stab
a man through the eye who spied on him inside his home without permission. VIII Sahih
Bukhari 8, no. 258.
19 Reza, supra note 4, at 724. Citing Abd Al-Qadir, 1 Tashri’ Al-Jina’I Al-Islami 220,
503 (1963).
20 Id. citing Abdul Latif Al-Humayyim, Ihtiram Al-Hayah Al-Khassah (“Al-Khususiyyah”)
Fi Alshariah Al-Islamiyyah Wa Al-Qanun Al-Muqaran (2004), 174. See also A. Q. Shaheed,
Criminal Law of Islam, 217-18(S. Zakir Aijas trans., 2005).
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stories suggest that otherwise guilty parties may be able to either suppress
evidence or avoid charges if authority figures violate the law in the process of
uncovering wrongdoing.
Another story ended differently. A woman was suspected of committing
adultery. Four men hid inside the house and surprised the woman and her
partner when they came inside.

Despite violating the prohibitions on home

entry and spying, Umar nevertheless allowed their testimony into evidence
against the man and woman.

The four men were still punished for their

wrongdoing. 21 In this case the ruler, Umar, did not suppress the evidence
(which by itself was insufficient evidence to prove adultery), and was willing to
punish both parties for their respective wrongdoing.

There is some dispute

among sources, but it is arguable that there may have been an analogue to the
American exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence in early Islamic law.

21

Id. at 727-28.
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B.

Seizures: Strong Evidentiary Requirements

Early traditions also prescribe procedures for judicial restraint and
oversight of pre-adjudication seizure of persons.

Under these traditions,

persons could not be thrown in prison without being given an opportunity to
defend themselves in open court.22

Detentions could be made, but only for

good reason. If the arresting party could not provide compelling justification to
the court for detention, then the prisoner would be released. 23 Evidence –
generally eyewitnesses – was necessary to justify detention, and detention
could be no longer than is necessary to determine whether further prosecution
is appropriate.24 Umar, for example, refused to seize a suspected thief without
a witness:
I set out with some riders and, when we arrived at Dhii
al Marwah, one of my garment bags was stolen. There
was one man among us whom we thought suspicious.
So my companions said to him: "Hey, you, give him
back his bag". But the man answered: "I didn't take it."
When I returned, I went to 'Umar ibn al Khattrb and
told him what had happened. He asked me how many
we had been, so I told him [who had been there]. I also
said to him: "Amir al Mu'minin, I wanted to bring the
man back in chains". 'Umar replied: "You would bring
him here in chains, and yet there was no witness? I
will not recompense you for your loss, nor will I make
inquiries about it". 'Umar became very upset. He never
recompensed me nor did he make any inquiries.25
Without some evidentiary basis beyond the fact of accusation, suspected
wrongdoers could not be detained or even charged with an offense.

22
23
24
25

Abul A’la Mawdudi, Human Rights in Islam 25 (1977).
Id.
Taha J. al-Alwani, Rights of the Accused (Part Two), 10 Arab. L. W., 234, 242.
Id. at 242-43, citing Abd al Razzdq, al Musannaf, vol. 10, p. 193.
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These stories, along with the above scriptural verses, are the starting
point for Islamic search and seizure law, at least so far as Sharia law is
concerned.

They serve as the foundation for later jurists whose doctrines

would form much of the body of Sharia law and procedure.26
II.

Medieval Jurisprudence: Reinterpreting Personal Law in Following
the Formation of a Centralized State Government.
Muslim scholars reinterpreted and expanded upon the Quran verses and

tradition stories during the middle ages. For example, search rules could be
applied differently depending upon who is doing the searching – they might be
more relaxed for state actors, particularly those with a high level of authority.
This is reflected in modern Saudi criminal practice, which has procedures for
obtaining search warrants.27 The development of differing rules for private and
state actors reflects that early Islamic law was designed to deal with disputes
between private persons, rather than between the state and an individual, as
well as the fact that private citizens could serve as a type of religious police,
and bring others to court for committing offenses.28
Mawardi, a political theorist and leading judge in eleventh century
Baghdad held state actors to a different standard than muhtasib, or the Sharia

26 While many crimes are traditional, five, at least, are found in scripture. The crimes
and evidence required for conviction are highly specific. Nevertheless, some, like theft and
highway robbery, have been extensively modified and expanded in modern Saudi Arabia.
These are (1) zina, or adultery, (2) qadf, or wrongful accusation of adultery, 3 shrub al-khamr,
or drinking alcohol, 4 sariqa, or theft, and (5) qat al-tariq, or highway robbery. Other offenses,
such as insurrection, apostacy, homicide, and bodily injury have also been recognized since
the first Muslim state. Wael B. Hallaq, Sharia: Theory, Practice, Transformations 310-22
(2009).
27 Law of Criminal Procedure, Art. 41, Royal Decree No. (M/39) (2001).
28 Hallaq, supra note 16 at 308-09. See also Reza, supra at note 4, 732-33. Muhtasib
could be either state actors or private citizens.
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courts – the state’s law enforcement powers exceeded those of volunteer
muhtasib and the ordinary Sharia courts, the qadi.29 Local magistrates (“amir”)
could conduct spying, order pre-adjudicative detention, and even require that
prisoners submit bail as a condition of release. Magistrates can have prisoners
beaten to force confessions, although forced confessions should not be used as
a basis for punishment.
A.

Search: Exceptions to the Sanctity of Private Homes

Multiple exceptions developed to the general prohibition on police
entering homes. Entering a home was forbidden unless: (1) the wrongdoing
traveled outside the home onto the street, (2) or when there was evidence that
the home’s inhabitants had committed wrongdoing on prior occasions (because
the sinner’s bad reputation essentially rendered the bad conduct public).30 (3)
Necessity, such as to put out a fire, was another excuse, (4) as was entry to
search for a wanted criminal.31
The prevention on spying was similarly modified.

Not all spying was

contrary to God’s command: “what distinguishes the kind of suspicion that
must be avoided from all other kinds of suspicion is that the kind of suspicion
for which no proof or apparent reason is known must be avoided.” 32 This

29 Abu'l-Hasan 'Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Habib al-Basri al-Baghdadi al-Mawardi, The
Ordinances of Government 309-11 (Trans. Asadullah Yate).
30 Eli Alshech, “Do Not Enter Houses Other than your Own”: The Evolution of the Notion of
a Private Domestic Sphere in Early Islamic Thought, 11 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 291, 298–300
(2004), citing Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani, 14 al-Nawadir wa’l-ziyadat ‘ala ma fial-Mudawwana
316 (1999).
31 Reza, supra at note 4, 731.
32 Taha J. al-Alwani, Rights of the Accused (Part One), 10 Arab. L. W., 3, 14.
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meant that surveillance, eavesdropping, and searches could be justified if there
was enough pre-existing suspicion.
The threshold for justifiable surveillance and search varied between the
medieval schools of law.

The scholar Hanbal, for example, whose thought

forms the basis for the modern Saudi legal system, told his followers to not
even attempt locating a house in which forbidden music was being played, even
if the music could be heard from the street, because “what is covered [by the
house] one [should] not search. 33

The early Hanbalite School of law thus

appeared to have offered protection against spying and searches of private
homes even if the criminal conduct was apparent from public spaces.

The

Hanbalis would not allow search of a house unless police inadvertently came
across an offense, and if it was immediately apparent without further search.34
If wrongdoing or evidence was out in the open and immediately apparent, then
there was no spying in the first place.35 Under this view, police could destroy
any contraband or try to stop any wrongdoing that they encountered in
public.36 Furthermore, if religious police had evidence or sufficient reason to
believe that a closed container or other personal effect contained contraband,
the contraband’s presence and nature was clear and the religious police could
seize and destroy it.37

33 Eli Alscheck, “Do Not Enter Houses other than Your Own”: The Evolution of the Notion
of a Private Domestic Sphere in Early Islamic Thought, 11 Islamic L. & Soc’y, 291, 300 (2004),
citing 2 Abd Allah b. Ahmad B. Hanbal 293 (1981).
34 Id. at 301.
35 Reza, supra at note 4, 732.
36 Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought 100
(2001).
37 Id.
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Surveillance and search rules were different outside the home. When in
public places, muhtasib were allowed to make inferences based on their
observations and intuition. For example, if a muhtasib encountered a person
on the street with a musical instrument partially sticking out of their pocket or
the smell of alcohol on their breath, the muhtasib could confiscate the
instrument or investigate further to see whether the suspect had been
drinking. This bears some resemblance to the American Terry standard, which
allows police to search suspects based on reasonable suspicion of criminal
conduct.
B.

Criteria for Arrest: Personal Reputation and Seizure

Under the eleventh century jurist Mawardi’s political theory, secular law
enforcement existed and operated parallel to religious law enforcement –
muhtasib and the qadi courts.

Secular law enforcement had greater arrest

powers than religious law enforcement, which were restricted by sharia’s
limitations

on

investigation

and

preventative

enforcement were not subject to the same rules.

detention.

Secular

law

A governor’s agents could

seize a person upon mere accusation of a crime and jail them pending
investigation into guilt or innocence. 38

The length of such preventative

detention appears to have varied based on the opinion of local rulers and the
facts of each case. 39

38
39

Not every medieval writer advocated having a dual

Frank E. Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia 234 (2004).
Id.

14

David Cicotte
dcicott@gmail.com
criminal justice system, but Mawardi’s writings may have reflected actual
practice in eleventh century Mesopotamia.40
Relevant factors for deciding whether to arrest and jail a person pending
trial included: (1) the gravity of the alleged crime, (2) quality and quantity of
evidence, with special concern for eyewitnesses, (3) and the accused’s personal
reputation.41 Crime seriousness was relevant more because of flight risk than
out of any concern for public safety or concern about revenge from a victim’s
family – serious offenses tended to carry harsher sentences and law
enforcement did not want suspects to flee during an ongoing investigation or
before trial.

The concern for number and quality of witnesses is easily

explained, in that witness testimony was the primary means of evidence in an
era before modern forensics – without witnesses it would not be possible to
prove who committed an offense. In addition, the set religious crimes, hadad
all required testimony from multiple witnesses. As for reputation, it could fall
into one of three categories: (a) a person could be well known in a community
as a good, hard-working and pious person, (b) could be publicly known as lazy,
sinful, or as a criminal, and (c) or have an unknown reputation, or anything
between the two extremes.

Accused persons in the first category would

probably not be detained or beaten, since law enforcement could be confident
that they would be honest enough to submit to judgment. The second category
would be detained, beaten, and forced to confess to the crime – their bad
40 The dual criminal system continued in practice at least through the thirteenth and
into the fourteenth century according to the medieval north African jurist ibn Khaldun. Abd al
Rahman bin Muhammed ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, 294 (Franz Rosenthal trans.1969).
41 Reza, supra at note 4, 754-55.
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reputation meant that they were likely guilty and a flight risk. Persons in the
third category would be detained until law enforcement could learn enough
about them to decide whether to release or detain them pending further
investigation and trial.
Detention could take the form of imprisonment but did not always do so.
A person could also be placed under house arrest, deposit a surety bond, or
obtain personal surety from a third party who would personally assume
responsibility for producing them later at court.42 Again, relevant factors in
determining whether to imprison a person pending investigation included the
gravity of the crime, flight risk, and the accused’s reputation.

Id. citing Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyah, Al-Turuq Al-Hukmiya Fi Al-Siyasah Al-Shar‘Iyah
[Procedures Of Administration] 89–92 (2002).
42
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III.

Current Saudi Law: The Practice of Extreme Judicial Discretion
Saudi Arabia, as stated in Article I of the monarchy’s Basic Law, tries to

follow sharia traditions as closely as possible, and comes closer to doing so
than any other country in the world. Except for a few ethnic minorities, the
vast majority of courts subscribe to the Hanbalite school of law. Hanbalites do
not subscribe to the view of binding precedents.43 Instead, Saudi judges use
their own legal reasoning, and derive appropriate rulings on a case-by-case
basis. Hanbalites use only the following as legal resources: Qur’an, Hadith
(traditional sayings of Muhammad), historic consensus of Muhammad’s
companions, and legal analogy. 44 There is no analogue to stare decisis in
Saudi Arabia and appeals court decisions apply only to individual cases. As a
result, both verdicts and sentences are unpredictable and can vary widely even
with cases that have similar fact patterns. Judges are able to exercise extreme
discretion, provided only that their rulings do not blatantly contradict Islamic
scripture or tradition.

Given the lack of codified laws and extreme judicial

discretion, lawyers have little power in court and are less useful than in the
United States.

Precarious Justice, 20 Human Rights Watch 12-13 (March 2008).
Muhammad Sa’Ad Al-Rasheed, Criminal Procedure in Saudi Judicial Institutions 23
(1973) (published thesis, Durham University) (Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1857/).
43
44
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A.

Modernizing the Law: Movement to Codify Criminal Procedure
and Criminal Law in Order to Limit Judicial Discretion and
Provide for Predictable Verdicts.

The Saudi Monarchy, at least in theory, has been attempting to limit
judicial discretion and introduce predictability into criminal law and procedure
for the last two decades.

In 1990, King Fahd attempted to codify rules of

procedure for sharia courts, but quickly retracted it due to judicial outcry.45
The monarchy reissued the rules of court procedure in 2000, and codified
Saudi Arabia’s first rule of criminal procedure in 2002.46 Under the criminal
procedure law searches are prohibited without force of law.

Homes are

specially protected and may not be searched without a warrant (although
warrants are issued by investigators, rather than the judiciary).47 Searches are
limited in scope to the crime for which the subject is accused and homes may
not be searched unless the owner or an adult family member is present.48 In
order to enforce these rules, the criminal procedure requires that records be
kept of each warrant search, including the text of the warrant, the date, time,
and location of the search, a description of the items seized, and the signature
of the home’s owner or witnesses.49 Arrestees must be informed of the reason
for their arrest and be given an opportunity to inform family members of their
detention.
detention,

50

There are procedures to prevent excessively long pretrial

although

these

are

relatively

Human Rights Watch, supra at note 43, 22.
Id.
47 Law of Criminal Procedure, Arts. 2, 40, 41. 122.
48 Id. Arts. 45-46.
49 Id. Art. 47.
50 Id. Art. 35.
45
46
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administrative processes within the criminal procedure code.51 Arrestees may
not be physically harmed, meaning, in theory, that police cannot beat
confessions out of arrestees.52 Finally, accused persons have a right to the
assistance of a lawyer during preliminary police investigation and trial.53
There is also some pressure among Saudi intellectuals to codify parts of
the sharia into a substantive criminal law.

Sheikh Abdullah Al-Mani, a

member of Saudi Arabia’s Council of Senior Scholars (the highest religious
body in Saudi Arabia), stated in an interview with the newspaper Asharq AlAwsat that
I have been calling for [codifying the law] for over 25
years. I called for codification according to the four
schools of thought, not only the Hanbali School. If an
official party took on this responsibility it would
undoubtedly reduce differences and would constitute a
strong factor in hastening the verdict in judicial
proceedings. It would also make rulings much clearer
for litigants before going to court. I would like to
emphasize that codification would be one way of
judicial reform in Saudi Arabia.54
And in 2007, the monarchy proclaimed that it would over the following years
reinvest in and reorganize the country’s judicial system, which would create
specialized commercial, labor, and administrative courts.55

Id. Arts. 109, 113, 114.
Id. Art. 35.
53 Id. Art. 4.
54 Interview with Saudi Conucil of Senior Ulama Member Sheikh Abdullah Al Manee,
Asharq al-Awsat (March 23, 2006). Available at:
http://www.aawsat.net/2006/03/article55267381. It is worth noting, that when asked if
penal law should be codified, he responded somewhat vaguely that “The law cannot be
changed, manipulated, or reinterpreted.”
55 Esther van Eijk, Sharia and National Law in Saudi Arabia, reprinted in Sharia
Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in
Past and Present 149-50 (Michiel Otto ed. 2010).
51
52
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B.

Saudi Practice: Police Ignore the Rules

These legal reforms have had little practical effect. Saudi residents are
often not aware of what their rights are or that they even have rights to begin
with.

Detainees must know their rights and insist that they be followed. 56

Police and prison officials are not familiar with criminal procedure standards,
and even “judges are not very conversant in the criminal procedure code.”57
The Haia in particular does not observe the Law of Criminal procedure
when arresting. Agents can enter homes without warrants if they learn that a
crime is in progress and police do not inform persons of their crimes upon
arrest. 58 Arbitrary arrests are also common: grounds for arrest can include
those such as “doubting the approach of the ruler and the present entity of the
state based on the application of the Book and the Sunna…and of doubting the
independence of the judiciary, and of deceiving the people.” 59

Police often

detain people without charges or access to legal counsel, and foreign detainees
often have little or delayed consular access if involved in a criminal case.60

Human Rights Watch, supra at note 43, 18.
Id.
58 Id. at 9 and 59.
59 Id. at 57.
60 United States Department of State, Saudi Arabia Country Specific Information, (Oct.
21, 2013, 4:44 PM), http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1012.html#country.
56
57
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United States Law: Fourth Amendment
Prohibition on Unreasonable Searches
The United States, unlike Saudi Arabia, has a textual constitution which
functions, at least in the area of search and seizure, as a general statement of
policy. Specific interpretation of constitutional text falls to individual courts.
Criminal defendants (only) may appeal a trial court’s ruling, potentially
multiple times. The United States Supreme Court is the court of last resort.
Its rulings serve to define a floor for permissible search and seizure practices.
All other levels of federal and state court are bound to follow constitutional
interpretations set by the United States Supreme Court.

Furthermore, all

lower courts are bound by appellate court rulings within their respective
jurisdiction, and individual courts tend to follow previous rulings unless there
is a compelling reason to the contrary (a common law concept referred to as
stare decisis – let it stand). Stare decisis allows for consistent and predictable
rulings across cases with similar sets of facts, while still allowing higher level
courts enough discretion to modify the law when either justice requires, or
when a court reinterprets a constitutional provision.
Since the federal constitution mentions both search and seizure
explicitly, the starting point in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is the text of
the constitution itself. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
21
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supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.61
The Fourth Amendment creates two rules: searches must be reasonable and
warrants require probable cause, supported by police assurances, and a
description of the areas to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The precise nature of these two rules – especially the one prohibiting
unreasonable searches – have varied both over time and with the facts of
different cases.

This section will start with a brief history of United States

search and seizure law, proceed to current law, examine current cultural
concerns, and then proceed to a sample case to illustrate how well police follow
the law, and what consequences may occur when they do not.

61

U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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I.

Fourth Amendment as Protection of Property, Not Persons
Until 1967, the Supreme Court determined the bounds of police search

and seizure by use of the criminal trespass doctrine.

If police, without a

warrant (i) intruded (ii) on a protected area of private property (iii) to obtain
information, then any information learned thereby was obtained illegally and
may have been suppressible at trial.

For example, in Silverman v. United

States, the Justice Stewart wrote that “eavesdropping accomplished by means
of such a physical intrusion [wa]s beyond the pale. 62

In that case, police

passed a microphone through a heating duct to listen in on a conversation
without the speakers’ consent or knowledge. The court ruled that the police
practice here was “an actual intrusion on a constitutionally protected area.”63
This older rule measured Fourth Amendment privacy concerns in terms of
property, rather than personal rights.

The trespass doctrine was not

concerned so much with privacy in and of itself or privacy in a personal sense
as it was with privacy in private property – especially the home. The trespass
doctrine reflected early American preoccupation, particularly among the social
elites of the revolutionary and industrial eras, with government infringement
upon private property. I mention the trespass standard because it was recently
resurrected in United States v. Jones. It is not yet clear how closely lower

Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961). The trespass doctrine
originated at the Supreme Court level in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
63 Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512.
62
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courts (or the Supreme Court) will follow this ruling, so its consequences
cannot yet be predicted.64
II.

Current Law: Fourth Amendment Protection of Persons, Rather
Than Property
A.

Social Privacy Expectations as the Basis for Reasonableness

Since 1967, rules surrounding reasonable searches have turned on
personal and social privacy expectations. In Katz v. United States, the Court
explicitly departed from the earlier property-based test. Justice Stewart wrote
that “the Fourth Amendment protects people – and not simply ‘areas’ – against
unreasonable searches and seizures…the reach of that Amendment cannot
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure.”65 Justice Harlan’s concurrence was later adopted by the Supreme
Court to define the bounds of what are and are not reasonable searches – ‘a
person must both have exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy
and, that expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.’66 A person can demonstrate a personal expectation of privacy by
taking precautions to ensure that their words and actions are not public – in
Katz, shutting the door of an otherwise public telephone booth was sufficient to
show a personal privacy expectation. The second prong of the test proves more
problematic. The Court tends to base public willingness to recognize privacy
interests based upon the reasoning of a majority of the court. The Supreme
Court over the last twenty five years has created such a high bar for
64
65
66

United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
Id. at 361.
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‘reasonable’ privacy expectations – for example homeowners must literally wall
and roof their back yards in order to constitutionally shield the area from
police view.67 Such a rule is clearly absurd on its face. If homeowners thought
that aerial shielding was necessary to ensure privacy of their yards, more
would enclose such spaces with roofs or tarps. This is not a common practice,
while five to eight foot high fences are relatively common. This lack of overhead
shielding shows that that homeowners expect their yards will typically be
private from aerial surveillance. As a general rule in the last thirty-five years,
the Supreme Court has gone out of its way to find the vast majority of police
search practices reasonable.
B.

Seizures: Probable Cause and Warrant Requirements

All seizures must follow the reasonableness standard. Seizures may be
of either a person or of property. Arrests are reasonable if the police (i) see a
person in the process of committing a crime, (ii) have probable cause to believe
that the person currently is committing or has committed a crime, or (iii) if they
have a warrant for a person’s arrest.68 Unlike in Saudi Arabia, United States
arrest warrants do not expire with passage of time. Police may seize two types
of property: evidence of a crime and contraband, which is property for which
the state has criminalized all possession. Police may seize such property if (i) it
is in plain view, (ii) if the property’s owner consents to a search, (iii) if they
come across it during an otherwise lawful search, (iv) or if they have a valid

67
68

California v. Ciraolo, 576 U.S. 207 (1986).
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
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warrant to seize the property. Warrants for searches and seizures of property
can go stale over time and eventually become invalid.69
C.

Constitutional Requirements for a Valid Warrant

If a warrant is valid, all searches and seizures pursuant to the warrant
are presumptively reasonable. In order for warrants to be valid, (i) the issuing
party must be a neutral magistrate. They do not have to be educated in the
law, but generally are lawyers.70 For a magistrate to be neutral, they must not
be compensated for issuing warrants or show overt partiality toward law
enforcement.71 (ii) Police must present probable cause to the magistrate either
that an individual is committing or has committed a crime, or that evidence of
a crime is or will soon be at a specific location.

Evidence or persons to be

seized must be described with particularity, although this requirement is a low
bar. A simple list, ending with a phrase like ‘all other evidence of X crime’ will
suffice.72

69 Whether a warrant has gone stale is generally left to the trial court’s discretion,
although appellate courts or even police themselves (however unlikely this may be) could
potentially declare a warrant stale.
70 Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
71 Connally v. Georgia, 44 U.S. 245 (1977).
72 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 464 (1976).
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D.

Warrant Exceptions: When Police May Constitutionally and
Reasonably Search Persons or Property Without a Warrant.

While warrants are presumptively required to legitimate a search and
some seizures, there are eight exceptions to the warrant requirement: consent,
plain view, exigent circumstances, search incident to arrest, inventory
searches, automobile searches, suspicion searches, and special needs
searches.
Consent and plain view are different from the others in that the Fourth
Amendment is not even implicated.

In a consent search, the actual or

apparent property owner willingly gives up their right to exclude police from
their property to permit a search. 73

In theory, the property owner retains

control over the duration and scope of the search. 74 Consent searches are
permissible on the grounds that citizens have the ability to waive their rights.
Plain view describes a situation in which no search actually occurs.

When

police are lawfully in a location in which they can plainly see and access
evidence or contraband, and immediately recognize the property as such, they
may seize the property. In such circumstances, the property owner has simply
been negligent in leaving the property in an area where police have access.75
There is another category of exceptions that arise from arrest or
impoundment – search incident to arrest and inventory searches. The Court
has held it reasonable for police to search suspects and areas within their
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
75 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321. Plain view searches do not have to be accidental or
inadvertent. Police simply must be in an area where they have lawful view and access to the
evidence or contraband. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
73
74
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reach upon arrest in order to disarm them and preserve evidence. 76

The

justifications are first, police safety, and second, a lack of reasonable privacy
interest in evidence of a crime.
A third category of warrant exceptions authorize searches of automobiles
or persons’ bodies based on probable cause or suspicion. Police may search
any automobile and corresponding containers if they have probable cause –
essentially a high degree of suspicion – that the vehicle contains contraband or
evidence of a crime.77 Police may additionally stop and detain a person for an
open-palmed pat down based on reasonable suspicion that they have been
engaged in criminal activity, either in the past, currently, or in the near
future.78 The level of suspicion necessary is less than probable cause – police
must be able to articulate a reason to justify the pat down. These are called
Terry searches, after the Supreme Court case which authorized their use.
There

is

another

catch-all

warrant

exception

called

“exigent

circumstances.” This exception allows the government to enter homes or other
private buildings because of pressing need.

For example, firefighters and

associated police may enter a burning building without a warrant to fight a fire
or render aid to inhabitants that they believe to be injured.79 The Supreme
Court also considers it reasonable to allow police to chase a suspected criminal
76

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752

(1969).
77 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) justifies automobile searches based on
being readily mobile. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in automobiles because
they are subject to pervasive state and federal regulation. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565
(1991) justifies searches of containers within automobiles.
78 Terry v. Ohio, 382 U.S. 1 (1968).
79 Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). This is called ‘emergency aid’
doctrine.
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into a private building without a warrant because criminals could either escape
or take hostages simply by entering private property.80
Finally, there is a special category of suspicion-less searches based on
special government needs.81 The most common form of special needs searches
are drug tests at schools or sobriety checkpoints on highways. Special needs
searches do not require any suspicion of criminal activity. The justification for
such searches is that the search is minimal, whereas there is a strong
government interest in prohibiting use of illegal drugs or driving while
intoxicated. If a special needs search becomes too invasive, or the government
interest is minimal, then a warrant becomes necessary. 82

Special needs

searches are unique among the warrant exceptions, because the Court departs
from the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ analysis, introduced in Katz.

80

Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). This is called the ‘hot pursuit’

doctrine.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
In Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009). In this case, the
Court overturned a strip search of a middle school girl because the government did not have a
strong enough interest in preventing her from using prescription ibuprofen.
81
82
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III.

Enforcement Mechanisms and Police Practice With a Focus on the
New York-Northern New Jersey Metropolitan Area
The United States judicial system provides several mechanisms by which

defendants may challenge an illegal search and seizure.

These include,

challenging the warrant upon which a search was based, the exclusion rule for
illegally obtained evidence, and a limited federal abrogation of sovereign
immunity against state police forces.
A.

Challenging Warrants: The Circumstances Under Which
Warrants May be Insufficient

While warrant searches are presumptively reasonable, warrants may still
be challenged. The person subject to a warrant may challenge it if they can
show that police supplied false information when seeking the warrant, either
intentionally or with reckless disregard for the possibility that the information
might be false.83 Of course, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a defendant to
obtain strong enough evidence to prove to a court that police knowingly or
recklessly lied to a judge in order to obtain a warrant.
Warrants may also be challenged if they fail to describe with enough
particularity the location to be searched or the evidence to be seized. These
standards are fairly generous.

For example, in Maryland v. Garrison, the

Supreme Court upheld a warrant describing the top floor of an apartment
building that had two units on that floor was upheld as being sufficiently

Virginia v. Moore, 533 U.S. 164 (2008). Mere negligence on the part of the police is
not enough. A suspect must be able to show that police acted with some sort of volition when
supplying false information to the issuing magistrate.
83

30

David Cicotte
dcicott@gmail.com
particular. 84 And even though the police made a mistake by searching an
innocent person’s apartment (which ended up containing illegal drugs) in
addition to their intended target’s apartment, this accidental search was still
valid.

And

even

a

warrant

authorizing

search

for

“other

fruits,

instrumentalities, and evidence of crime at this time unknown” was sufficiently
particular when the warrant at least specified the crime for which police were
seeking evidence.85
A defendant may also challenge a warrant if it was not properly
executed. Police must comply with the limitations found in the warrant and
may not search outside of the warrant’s scope.86 Finally, there is a general rule
requiring police to knock at a door, announce their presence, and give a
property owner time to open a door.

The purpose of this rule is to provide

some limited privacy and property protection.87
Under the above standards, it is generally difficult for defendants to
successfully challenge a warrant as the particularity requirement is not very
strong and since it is difficult for defendants to prove that police obtained or
improperly executed a warrant.

A more common and generally more

Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987).
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
86 Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987). In this case, the court upheld a search
technically outside the scope of the warrant due to an accidental police mistake. If the police
had purposefully acted outside of the warrant’s scope, the illegally obtained evidence could
have been suppressible.
87 There are multiple exceptions to this rule, including danger to police or risk of
destroying evidence. Failure to follow a knock and announce rule is not likely to result in
suppression of evidence since the rule is intended to protect privacy and property – it does not
affect the legitimacy of otherwise legally obtained evidence.
84
85
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successful strategy is to challenge the process of the search itself in order to
prevent evidence from being presented at trial.
B.

Exclusionary Rule: Preventing Introduction of Evidence at
Trial to Encourage Police Compliance with the Fourth
Amendment

Federal and State courts may choose to punish police for obtaining
evidence illegally by excluding evidence from potential use at trial.88 Evidence
is considered illegally obtained if police perform an unreasonable search or
seizure.

Unreasonable searches are those that:

are done pursuant to an

improperly obtained or improperly executed warrant, or are implemented
without a warrant or relevant warrant exception. In order to suppress illegally
obtained evidence, a defendant must prove that they have standing to
challenge the search. A defendant can prove standing by showing that they
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property searched. Generally,
this amounts to establishing personal ownership of the property, since courts
will generally hold that defendants do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in others’ property.89
There are several exceptions to this rule that do limit its effectiveness. If
police would have inevitably discovered the same evidence legally, or similar
evidence from an independent source legally, then a court will still admit the

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The exclusionary rule was incorporated onto the
states in this case. The rule was first formally introduced in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S>
383 (1914).
89 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
88
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evidence.90 For example: in Nix v. Williams, police were transporting a known
murderer between two cities to meet with his attorney.91 The officer driving the
defendant, knowing that he was religious, remarked how it would be a shame
that the child victim’s parents would never be able to find the body to give her
a proper Christian burial. The defendant felt guilty and directed the officer to
the body’s location. Typically, a court should suppress this information, since
the officer deliberately elicited incriminating information from a man that the
officer knew was represented by a lawyer, outside of the lawyer’s presence. In
this case, however, the Supreme Court ruled that the incriminating statement
should still be admitted, since police were already searching in the immediate
area of the body’s location and would have most likely found it even without
the defendant’s help.
One final limitation is that a police officer must commit the error in order
for evidence to be suppressible. For example: if a judge makes an error in
finding probable cause and police act on that error, using the warrant to
conduct a search or arrest, any evidence obtained thereby will generally not be
suppressed.

This is because the justification for excluding evidence is to

punish police for violating the Fourth Amendment. In a scenario where a judge
erred in finding probable cause, the judge made the mistake – not the police –

For example, if police force a suspect to confess, leading them to evidence in an area
that they were about to search anyway, the evidence is still admissible.
91 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1981).
90
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meaning that there would be no reason to punish the police by suppressing
evidence.
C.

92

Civil Causes of Action: State Liability for Police Violations of
Citizens’ Civil Rights

42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted in 1871 as part of the Civil Rights Act. As
currently amended, it creates a civil cause of action against the state for
violating the constitutional or other legal rights of any person within the United
States. In Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme Court held that police could be acting
“under color of any statute…” even when they were violating the law. Thus,
victims could bring a civil rights cause of action against the state, even when
police act outside their authority. 93

The Supreme Court expanded Section

1983 to include municipalities in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the
City of New York. 94

This meant that local government could be sued for

damages based on official policy or governmental custom that deprived citizens
of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 was again expanded in Bivens v. Six

Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics such that victims could
obtain monetary damages for injuries inflicted by federal police while in the
process of violating their Fourth Amendment rights.95

92 A person must have standing before they can challenge a search. Standing is created
by having a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched or the property seized.
Functionally, one must have ownership in order to have standing to challenge a search. The
logic goes that if a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the object seized
or place searched, then their Fourth Amendment rights could not have been violated under the
Katz test. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
93 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
94 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)

Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388,
395-96 (1971).
95
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In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege that a person (according to Monell, person can include local
government bodies) must act under color of law (in official capacity as a state
government employee by virtue of the actor’s power as a state employee) and
subject or cause to be subjected (cause; note that there is no intent
requirement) a deprivation of rights (rights protected by federal statute or the
United States Constitution) and shall be liable…in action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress (The defendant may be sued in federal
court).
Section 1983 does not create respondeat superior liability against local
government solely based on the actions of government employees.

The

government employee must have been following some sort of government law or
policy that suggested violation of constitutional rights in order for Section 1983
to apply.96 It is therefore difficult, from a practical standpoint, to state a cause
of action against a single rogue police officer. And even when a victim is able to
state a cause of action under Section 1983, it is often difficult for a victim to
win either damages or injunctive relief in a Section 1983 suit at trial. 97

Id. at 691.
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95. In this case the Supreme Court held that
in order to obtain injunctive relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must be able to establish real
and immediate threat that they, personally, will be injured again by the policy at issue, that the
conduct at issue is police policy, and that it is uniformly applied in all similar circumstances.
In this case, the conduct at issue was a dangerous police choke hold. See also Paul Hoffman,
The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in Controlling Police
Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1453, 1504-05 (1993). The article investigates the
difficulty of bringing Section 1983 claims given the absence of respondeat superior liability.
Alleged misconduct must be proven to be a part of department policy or custom in order to give
rise to civil liability.
96
97
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Nevertheless, as seen in the following section, municipalities do sometimes
settle when there appears to be sufficient risk of loss.98 An example of a local
Section 1983 lawsuit follows.
D.

Allegations of Police Misconduct in Newark, New Jersey:
Qualls v. City of Newark

This local sample case illustrates the kinds of police abuses that are
often alleged in violent, high-crime areas, and to investigate how municipalities
subject to such pressures might respond. The case was not taken to trial, so
the facts alleged in the complaint were not proven in court. Given the small
damage settlement, the allegations below are probably exaggerated. Even so,
there may be some evidence supporting the claims – otherwise the plaintiff’s
attorney would not have taken the case.99 The sheer volume of complaints and
settlements between 2008 and 2010 cited in the ACLU study also suggest
problems within the Newark Police Department.
According to the complaint, the plaintiff, Sharonda Qualls, was been
called to testify as a witness in the May 1999 trial of State of New Jersey v.
Kareem Coleman at the Essex County courthouse.100 She intended to provide
information that would confirm an alibi for the defendant in that case. Ms.
Qualls alleged that while she was waiting to testify outside the courtroom,
Essex County Detective Kurt Swindell attempted to intimidate her.

98

The

Or when offering a settlement is less expensive than defending against a Section 1982

claim.
99 In the Matter of A Petition for An Investigation into the Newark, New Jersey Police
Department by the United States Department of Justice Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141.
100 All information below is taken from the following compliant: Qualls v. City of
Newark, Civil Action No. 2:01cv02860, District of New Jersey, 2003.
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detective allegedly referred to the inhabitants of her apartment complex as
“animals” and threatened to ‘come pay them a visit’ and “knock down some
doors.”

On May 5, 1999, Ms. Qualls testified, providing defendant Kareem

Coleman with an alibi. On May 6, 1999, City of Newark Officer Willie Thomas
obtained a search warrant for Ms. Qualls’ unit at the Bradley Court apartment
complex in Newark. On May 12, 1999, the Coleman jury was hung and the
Court declared a mistrial.

On May 14, 1999, at 5:30 A.M., between ten to

twenty law enforcement officers broke into Ms. Qualls’ apartment on the basis
of the May 6, 1999 warrant. Ms. Qualls alleged that the Newark Police failed to
knock and announce their presence before battering down the apartment door,
which was knocked off its hinges. She also alleged that the warrant was stale
and that the Newark Police searched beyond the defined scope of the
warrant.101 She also suggested that police assaulted her twelve year old son,
Lawrence, and handcuffed him to a chair. Ms. Qualls was also then allegedly
stripped searched and cavity searched by a female officer in the presence of
multiple male officers.

After the incident, Lawrence was treated for injuries

sustained during the incident at Newark Beth Israel. As the police left, one
was alleged to have stated “I bet you won’t go testify at the next trial.”
Later on May 14, 1999, Ms. Qualls submitted a complaint with the
Newark Police Department of Internal Affairs.

The department claimed no

knowledge of the raid and would not give them a copy of the incident report.
101 The search warrant was to look for illegal Controlled Dangerous Substances (drugs).
According to the complaint, the search was extensive and careless. The police were alleged to
have overturned most of the furniture and emptied out all possible containers. She also
alleged that they stole money and property.
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The department did not return any further calls.

She then proceeded to

complain to the city government. At a meeting in the mayor’s office, Internal
Affairs claimed to have no record of her May 14 visit. Internal affairs refused to
take the case, so Ms. Qualls sought independent legal help, which in turn led
to the filing of a civil suit against the City of Newark in 2001.
Ms. Qualls alleged that the May 6, 1999 warrant to search her apartment
had been obtained using false and misleading information and that without
such information the warrant could not have been issued. She charges that
the search was part of a conspiracy amongst certain Essex County detectives
and Newark Police to punish her for testifying and providing a defendant with
an alibi in the above criminal case.

Ms. Qualls was never charged with

committing a crime.102
On June 2, 2010, Newark reached a settlement with Ms. Qualls, whereby
it passed a statute that paid her a sum of $35,000 in damages.103
Because of this case and others like it, the American Civil Liberties Union
petitioned the United States Department of Justice to conduct an external
investigation of the Newark Police Department for constitutional rights
violations.104 The petition noted four hundred and seven (407) allegations of

102 Petition, at 26, In the Matter of A Petition for An Investigation into the Newark, New
Jersey Police Department by the United States Department of Justice Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
14141, 2011.)
103 Newark, N.J. Resolution 10-0768 (2010). In the Stipulation of Settlement, the
Newark explicitly disclaims any liability. Since this case was not taken to court, all that the
settlement proves is that the Newark government preferred to pay a settlement of $35,000
rather than take the case to trial.
104 See Petition, supra at note 93. According to the American Civil Liberties Union of
New Jersey, the Department of Justice granted their petition and began investigating the
practices of the Newark Police Department on May 9, 2011, for constitutional rights violations.
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Newark Police Department over a period of two and a half years between 2008
and 2010, which resulted in thirty eight settlements with a value in excess of
$4,700,000. 105 The Justice Department granted the petition and began an
investigation on May 9, 2011. 106

The volume of complaints, lawsuits, and

successful settlements suggest some truth to allegations of police misconduct
in Newark.

Nevertheless, not only are some victims able to obtain

compensation for having their rights violated, but the Federal Government is
willing to investigate and fix the problems in the Newark Police Department.
E.

New Jersey State Police: Substantial Compliance with the
Fourth Amendment

It is difficult to make generalizations about American Police compliance
with the Constitution, given the large number of police departments across the
country and their differing situations. Internal reports from the New Jersey
State Police suggest that they are at near full compliance with state law and
that traffic stops are subject to three levels of supervisory review in order to
ensure compliance, which include review of audio and video recording
equipment installed in every police car.107 In 2011, the New Jersey State Police
were subject to 591 misconduct allegations, 238 of which proceeded as cases
and 146 of which were closed.108 All allegations were investigated, and roughly

American Civil Liberties Union, Petition to Investigate the Newark Police Department (Oct. 21,
2013 at 5:01 PM), http://www.aclu-nj.org/legaldocket/petitiontoinvestigatethene/.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Seventeenth Progress / Status Summary of the Consent Decree Entered Into by the
United States of America and the State of New Jersey Regarding the New Jersey Division of
State Police, 39-40, 44.
108 Office of Law Enforcement Professional Standards, First Public Aggregate Misconduct
Report (February, 2013), 6.

39

David Cicotte
dcicott@gmail.com
35% were found to be unsubstantiated.109 Complaints were evenly distributed
across the state. 110

Of closed misconduct cases, the largest category of

infractions was for violations of administrative procedure or failure to follow
police procedure (which can include everything from excessive force to simple
attitude and demeanor). 111

41 such cases were investigated and closed in

2011, resulting in some sort of internal discipline.112 This was the first study
of its type, so it is not possible to analyze statistical trends. The New Jersey
State troopers’ general compliance with the Constitution contrasts sharply with
the anecdotal information given by the American Civil Liberties Union
regarding Newark, which suggest widespread disregard for the law.

109
110
111
112

Id. at 13.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 14.
Id.
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Conclusion
Both American and Saudi law place limits on searches and seizure. The
United States has done so by judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment,
whereas Saudi Arabia has done so by royal decree and statute.

The two

different schemes offer differing levels of protection, but both provide basic
protections against arbitrary arrest and unreasonable property searches.
Furthermore, it is clear that both American police and Saudi police are
susceptible to abusing their power and committing misconduct.

Ultimately,

the Fourth Amendment provides greater protection than the Saudi Basic Law
and Criminal Procedure for three reasons:

culture, codified laws, and

enforcement mechanisms.
I.

Differing Societies: Privacy Concerns in America as Compared to
Privacy in Saudi Arabia
Islamic search and seizure rules suggest concerns similar to those

behind the Fourth Amendment in the United States’ constitution – protection of
property and persons from uninhibited intrusion. Both ‘constitutions’ suggest
some sort of privacy interest as well. The American Supreme Court currently
defines

this

privacy

interest

in

terms

reasonableness,

whereby

reasonableness of searches is measured by social expectations.

the

Islamic law

also appears concerned with privacy interests, but for reasons other than social
expectations. Breaches of search and seizure rules violate divine commands,
and are thus considered sinful. Judging from medieval jurisprudence, it does
not appear that law enforcement was punished for violating religious rules.
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Islamic search and seizure rules, as embodied in the Sharia, are based
on underlying cultural concerns for modesty, personal reputation, and trust
which are not protected under the United States Constitution.113 This makes
sense when considering the religious basis for the law and underlying Arab
culture that pre-existed the law. Medieval Arabia was primarily tribal, with a
handful of small towns scattered about – none numbering more than a few
thousand inhabitants, except for Mecca during the pre-Muslim pilgrimages.114
In such a society, business dealings with others were generally more personal
than in the modern world. This helps to explain the concerns over personal
reputation.

No merchant would make a contract to buy goods from a

merchant, nor would a tribal chieftain agree to guide a caravan across the
desert if either were concerned about the honesty of Arab caravan organizers.
Muslim concern over modesty was also extreme. For example: children
and slaves were required to ask permission before reentering their households
in the mornings or following the afternoon rest because they might see their
parents or owners undressed or in their undergarments. 115

This same

reasoning carries over to the commandments not to enter or spy. The concern
was not so much about personal property rights, but over citizen-police viewing
people doing something private.

113 The Supreme Court held explicitly in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976) that
there is no constitutional interest in reputation.
114 The Kaba shrine in Mecca and accompanying pilgrimages were originally pagan in
nature and predate Islam by at least a century.
115 Quran 24:58-59.
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Given differing concerns, Islamic and American law offer somewhat
different protections. While both types of law theoretically forbid police entry
into private homes, only Islamic law prohibits police from engaging in covert
surveillance. And while both American and Muslim religious police may stop
and arrest if they come across a crime in progress, American police may utilize
proactive investigation and warrants to make arrests in order to prevent future
crimes from occurring.
The American Concern’s current Fourth Amendment test, which
measures socially recognizable expectations of privacy may reflect the
underlying values of society to some extent, at least in the test itself.

It

arguably does not, however, reflect American cultural values in how it is
applied. The Supreme Court has used the reasonable expectation of privacy
test to allow everything from telephone and utility record searches to aerial
surveillance of suburban back yards. Such allowances do not match up with
social expectations.116 On the other hand, however - while no one wishes to be
observed by law enforcement through invasive techniques, society at the same
time has not launched massive protests at Congress to pass statutes that
would provide for more protection. This may mean that Americans either (1)
cannot be bothered, or (2), that Americans, despite their concerns over lost
privacy, value the added security against crime that is provided by proactive
and invasive law enforcement investigatory procedures.

It is difficult to make

a definitive statement either way, since the Supreme Court is removed from
The mere fact that the average homeowner does fence their yard, but does not cover
it with a tarp suggests that they desire privacy, but do not expect to be viewed from the air.
116
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and unaccountable to society.

This is not to say that the Justices are

unconcerned with how their rulings may affect society. Rather, the justices
may just not understand the American people.
Saudi law does, despite suggestions in the Basic Law to the contrary,
differ somewhat from the ideals espoused in theoretical religious law.

The

Basic Law and sample case show that all levels of Saudi police conduct
proactive investigations to seek out crime. And, once found, they are able to
conduct raids to arrest criminals and seize evidence. This type of conduct, in
and of itself, should be expected from any law enforcement in the modern
world, even if it does contradict Sharia teachings.

Sharia treats offenses as

either personal or against God – it does not have a concept of offenses against
the state.

The modern Saudi state could not function if it relied solely on

Sharia because many modern offenses, such as embezzling money did not exist
during the middle-ages. Furthermore, if the Saudi state were not allowed to
proactively investigate crime, as required by sharia law, more crime would
occur and more citizens would be victimized.

This is not to mean that the

cultural concerns over modesty have disappeared. If anything, the current law,
which drives women to cover themselves from head to toe and stay inside at
most times shows that such privacy concerns have intensified over the
intervening centuries. Rather, the Saudi monarchy’s interest in enforcing laws
and maintaining public overcome the ordinary citizen’s interest in modesty and
privacy.
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II.

Codified Laws Provide Predictability
Codified laws are also important, since they inform all parties to a

criminal suit what actions are a crime, what the state must do to prove guilt,
and how the state is allowed to treat a defendant during arrest, investigation,
and trial.

Having an established set of rules that is known to all parties can

prevent multiple abuses. If police can only arrest for specific activity, then it
becomes much more difficult for police to arbitrarily arrest political dissidents
or other unpopular minorities along general grounds of preserving public
order.117
As things stand now, Saudi citizens cannot know what all conduct,
besides obvious crimes like theft or assault, could lead to arrest.

Of course,

the same thing can also be said of U.S. citizens – the federal penal code alone,
18 U.S.C., has over six thousand sections. While most people in the United
States may not be aware of the intricacies of criminal law, criminal defense
attorneys, along with law enforcement and the court system most certainly are.
United States law enforcement must justify arrests by showing probable cause
of a statutory violation. And United States courts can only convict a defendant
if the state proves that the defendant committed every element of a crime, as
enumerated in the statute. Most metropolitan areas in the United States have
so much crime that prosecutors must choose cases in which they will press
charges. Prosecutors are unlikely to charge a defendant when there is little or

Perhaps one of the reasons that the monarchy has not codified more of its criminal
law is that it prefers that police have the flexibility to arrest political dissidents without having
to come up with a better pretext than being publicly disruptive.
117
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no evidence that the suspect committed each element of the crime for which
police arrested him. This contrasts with Saudi Arabia, where prosecutors, who
do not have to prove elements of criminal statutes, can call any potentially
disruptive behavior criminal, and essentially create an offense that matches the
suspect’s conduct.
III.

Enforcement Mechanisms Help to Prevent Police Misconduct
Finally, codifying the Sharia would be meaningless without proper

enforcement mechanisms.

The Haia regularly violates existing written laws,

engaging in raids without warrants, beating suspects while in custody, and
engaging in dangerous high speed automobile chases.

Most complaints are

made against the Haia and the Mabahith, rather than the regular police force.
The Haia act without warrants, beat suspects, engage in dangerous activity,
and act as much as a vigilante group as law enforcement. Complaints against
the Mabahith, on the other hand, surround prison abuses. Prisoners allege
that they are not informed of their charges, are refused attorneys, and are even
held past the duration of their sentences.

A large proportion of such

complaints are from foreigners, which may suggest that the legal system is
biased against non-citizens. There do not appear to be any major allegations
regarding abuse by the regular police force.

Whether this is because the

regular police follow the rules or because complaints do not make it to foreign
media is not clear.
Furthermore, the courts themselves are either unfamiliar with or actively
ignore criminal procedure rights.

Saudi Arabia does not have an existing
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framework similar to the exclusion rule, civil rights suits against the
government, or even internal affairs offices tasked with disciplining police
misconduct.

The Saudi judicial system and law enforcement agencies will

likely continue to ignore the criminal procedure and any statutory rights
introduced in the future unless the Saudi monarchy establishes internal
enforcement mechanisms that create negative consequences for police and
judges who violate or ignore the law.
The situation is different in the United States.

State and federal

governments have established mechanisms for holding police accountable,
such as regular internal review of police actions, administrative discipline of
police, the exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence, and waiver of state
immunity for civil rights violations.

This is not to say that abuse does not

occur, or that it is a simple task for an American to prevail upon a suppression
motion or civil rights suit. Furthermore, as Ms. Qualls’s case showed, victims
often allege internal affairs units try to cover up the wrongdoing. If true, this
means that existing enforcement mechanisms may be inadequate where those
in charge of disciplining police are unwilling to do so. It is difficult to make any
kind of definitive statement about the country, because regions can differ
widely and because few empirical studies regarding police misconduct exist. If
the New Jersey State Police report is indicative of the rest of the country,
however, only about five percent of police face allegations of misconduct, and
only around five percent of those allegations involve serious infringement upon
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constitutional rights. For this one law enforcement agency, at least, existing
enforcement mechanisms appear effective.
As the Huraisi case showed, the Saudi government is currently flirting
with the idea of police discipline by allowing criminal prosecution of Haia
officers who killed a suspect in their custody. As the case also showed, the
judicial system responded by acquitting all the religious police, leaving only a
private volunteer to face trial. Until the Saudi government forces its courts to
take such trials seriously, and until it establishes and enforces disciplinary
procedures against the Haia and Mabahith, civil rights abuses will continue.
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